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With patent laws governments intervene into the marketplace to provide incentives to 
innovators to invest their know-how, time, and money into the creation of inventions 
under circumstances of the appropriability problem associated with intangible assets. 
The intellectual property notion of trade secrecy means specific information that 
possesses commercial value and that reasonable efforts have been taken to keep it secret. 
Innovative pharmaceuticals, both radical and incremental, are especially susceptible to 
the appropriability problem in knowledge-based economic activity, for turning a 
prospective molecule as identified in the laboratory into a medicine that may be 
distributed in the public health system requires many years of computer modeling, 
animal-testing and, finally, clinical trial testing. Clinical trials are performed in three 
phases and each phase results in a plethora of data. Drug laws specify that such data are 
kept confidential by health regulatory authorities for a period of 5 years in the United 
States and for longer periods in most of Europe. Sufficiently strong appropriability 
regimes facilitate licensing and cross-licensing relationships between and among 
universities and business. Substantial empirical research supports the utility of the Bayh-
Dole model and doubts the existence of a patent anti-commons (editor note: the existence 
of numerous rights holders frustrates achieving a socially desirable outcome), in the life 
sciences. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Capitalist economies force business enterprises to innovate or die by establishing 
a competitive marketplace in which ―the prime weapon of competition is not price but 
innovation‖ (BAUMOL, 2002, p. 4). It takes new ideas, methods, and inventions to 
increase productivity, improve industrial processes, and introduce better products in the 
marketplace. Innovative ideas, methods, and products depend upon knowledge and 
human capital, upon information-rich workers with know-how and learning capacity 
(ROSENBERG; LANDAU; MOWERY, 1992). 
In our era, national comparative advantages are measured by how technology 
institutions manage and apply technology and practical knowledge (ZIEGLER, 1995). 
The notion of the national innovation system, i.e., ―the cluster of institutions, policies, 
and practices that determine an industry or nation‘s capacity to generate and apply 
innovations‖ (STEIL; VICTOR; NELSON, 2002, p. 3), such as those in the United States 
and Europe, either encourages or discourages bio-medical R&D. ―There is no 
presumption that the system was, in some sense, consciously designed, or even that the 
set of institutions involved works together smoothly and coherently‖ (NELSON, 1993, p. 
4). Institutional economists explain that a national innovation system composed of 
institutions, policies, and practices determines a country‘s innovative capacities.  Most 
radical-innovation pharmaceuticals have been invented in either the United States or 
Europe and a preponderance of the incremental-innovation pharmaceuticals as well 
(SCRIABINE, 1999). The national innovation systems of the United States and Europe 
owe to long-established patterns of institutions and markets, including market and 
corporate structures, laws, policies, regulations, and public administration practices, and 
universities and technology institutions, and that these different national innovation 
systems yield strikingly different results with respect to technology innovation.   
U.S. science and technology policy deliberately encourages public-private 
partnerships to develop new pharmaceuticals through intellectual property rights-based 
transfer of basic life sciences research findings into useful innovative medicines 
(BRANSCOMB, 1995; KUEHN; PORTER, 1981). Basic medical science research is 
conducted in universities and teaching-hospitals because of the many billions of dollars 
of public funding ($27 billion in support to medical science through the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health in 2006, but also euros invested into medical science research by 
Europeans and yen invested by Japanese) which aims to advance the state of medical 
science. The pharmaceutical companies play the commercializer role in a network of 
innovation that involves universities, research hospitals, and public research laboratories 
(GALAMBOS, 1995). The drug development researchers at the pharmaceutical 
companies learn from the medical scientists in the universities and research clinics and 
laboratories, then apply their own knowledge of chemistry, laboratory testing and 
evaluation, and human clinical trial testing evaluation and statistical analysis in order to 
develop a marketable drug. Medical scientists learn from the drug developers so that 
dynamic feed-back loops of knowledge exchange drive basic and applied medical 
knowledge advance. 
Europeans, by contrast, have remained true to the original nineteenth-century 
model of the German research university (OWEN-SMITH et al., 2002; SOETE, 2007). 
European government laws constrain public-private research partnerships and European 
university cultural norms chill faculty-company market application-directed 
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collaborations. The U.S. Bayh-Dole law and its brethren in the early 1980s provided for 
the patentability of publicly-funded research, thereby encouraging licensing to the private 
sector for further R&D by existing and start-up firms. Other scholars, however, argue that 
Europeans should not apply the U.S. Bayh-Dole patent regime to their universities 
because their missions as research and education centers will be subverted (DAVID, 
2007). Indeed, a number of legal scholars (EISENBERG, 1987, 1989, 1996; RAI, 1999, 
2001) and institutional economists (MOWERY, 2007; MOWERY et al., 1999; 
MOWERY; SAMPAT; ZIEDONIS, 2002; NELSON, 2004) express the same concerns 
about the impact of the Bayh-Dole regime on the U.S. innovation system. These 
arguments and the related scholarship are reviewed. 
 
2  BIO-MEDICAL “TECHNOLOGY APPROPRIABILITY” 
 
Intellectual property rights create incentives to invest in and commercialize 
technologies and useful knowledge, explains institutional economist North (1981, p. 
164): ―A systematic set of incentives to encourage technological change and raise the 
private return on innovation closer to the social rate of return was established only with 
the patent system‖. With patent laws, governments intervene into the marketplace to 
provide incentives to innovators to invest their know-how, time, and money into the 
creation of inventions under circumstances of the appropriability problem associated 
with intangible assets (DAM, 1994, p. 247). Without market intervention, the investment 
into knowledge-based innovation may be unjustifiable because the risk is great that a 
competitor will appropriate the invention with modest, less risky investment.  
With the patent right, government confers to an inventor the exclusive right to 
make, manufacture, distribute, and license to distribute the invention. To receive a patent 
the invention must be new or novel or show an inventive step and must have utility in the 
marketplace, a decision made through a formal examination process. The concept of 
novelty is core to the economics of technology innovation and the patent system 
(SCOTCHMER; GREEN, 1990). The examiner searches the relevant prior art to 
determine what a person having ordinary skill in the art knows and then makes a decision 
regarding the claim. Decisions may be appealed when an applicant fails and competitors 
may challenge the validity of the patent in court if they think the patent was granted by 
the patent office in error. Patent administration is thereby guided by a body of court-made 
administrative law that defines what concepts such as being new, novel, and nonobvious 
actually mean in practice (MERGES, 1988; DUFFY, 2007).  
 However, to describe a patent as conferring a monopoly is naïve (KITCH, 1980). 
The patent right is limited in duration in general to 20 years and is further limited by 
definition of its scope. Scope concerns the actual breadth of the claim of the patent: ―The 
scope of the claims of a patent determines the ability of competitors to produce 
substitutes without fear of infringement suits, and hence the real market power of the 
patent holder‖ (MERGES; NELSON, 1994, p. 1). With the policy goal of preventing 
patent systems from becoming anti-competitive and, hence, innovation-discouraging 
rather than innovation-encouraging, legislatures and courts have attempted through the 
years to balance the incentive of exclusivity against the incentive of competition when 
setting the proper scope, or breadth, of patent (MERGES; NELSON, 1990, p. 839). 
Institutional economists focus research on patent scope as critical to the economics of 
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technology innovation entry and competition (KLEMPER, 1990; GILBERT; SHAPIRO, 
1990; SCOTCHMER, 1991, 1996).   
Since a patent confers exclusive rights in the marketplace over a product or 
process, albeit with time and scope limits, patent law demands full public disclosure of 
the know-how of the innovation when the patent is granted (ORDOVER, 1991). Patent 
documents thereby become useful sources of information regarding the economics of 
technology innovation. Study of patents counts can indicate research commitment, 
though actual innovativeness is a trickier issue (NARIN; NOMA; PERRY, 1987), and 
citation patterns can allow study of the trail of technology innovation across firms and 
countries and thereby reveal patterns (GRILICHES, 1990). Managerial economists 
thereby use patent data to study the social-organization and geography of R&D and 
technology innovation (ALMEIDA; KOGUT, 1999). 
The technology appropriability model also concerns the intellectual property 
notion of trade secrecy. A trade secret is information that can be specified with sufficient 
specificity, possesses commercial value, and that reasonable efforts have been taken to 
keep it secret. The law and policy of trade secrecy is rooted in notions of individual 
liberty, confidentiality, relational trust, common morality, and obligation as well as the 
notion of intellectual property (PAINE, 1991). Trade secret law and policy owes to 
incentives provided in market economies to holding valuable information dear and draws 
from the law of tort, contract, and competition and relates to patent law (KITCH, 1980). 
The inventor who decides to protect an innovation through trade secrecy simply does not 
disclose the know-how associated with the invention and does so for the competitive 
advantages conferred by exclusivity, information opaqueness, and potentially unlimited 
duration. However, trade secrets can be legally safeguarded against misappropriation but 
not against independent discovery or accidental leakage (FRIEDMAN; LANDES; 
POSNER, 1991). Thus, innovators sometimes determine that the limitations of trade 
secret protection make application for patent the better intellectual property management 
choice. 
Technology innovators make their investment and business strategy decisions 
within particular intellectual property environments, what may be called the technology 
appropriability regime (TEECE, 1987). The technology appropriability regime ranges 
from tight or strong to loose or weak owing to how the laws are written by legislatures, 
implemented and administered by public administrators, and adjudicated by judges. 
Whether a technology appropriability regime is tight or loose has big implications for 
firm managers decide to manage their intellectual capital: ―[Intangible] assets can be the 
source of competitive advantage only if they are supported by a regime of strong 
appropriability or are non-tradeable or ‗sticky‘ ‖ (that is, difficult by their nature to 
imitate, explains managerial economist TEECE, 2000, p. 20). That is, managers enter 
industry sector markets and country markets where they can appropriate superior returns 
on their technology and knowledge-based investments and avoid market entry where the 
risks of intellectual property leakage are unacceptably high.   
Economic research regarding technology innovation shows that the research-
based pharmaceutical sector is the most patent-dependent of any industry sector 
(MANSFIELD, 1986; PAKES; SIMPSON, 1989). Innovative drugs are especially 
susceptible to the appropriability problem in knowledge-based economic activity, for 
turning a prospective chemical compound as identified in the laboratory into a drug that 
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may be distributed in the public health system requires many years of computer 
modeling, animal-testing and, finally, clinical trial testing. Clinical trials are performed in 
three phases and each phase results in a plethora of data. In Phase I, healthy volunteers 
are tested for dosage safety. In Phase II, a larger number of actual patients suffering from 
the malady are treated with the therapy to test for safety. In Phase III, many thousands of 
patients involving many hospitals and clinics are evaluated to demonstrate safety and 
efficacy.   
Throughout this process, innovators will keep careful records of test results for 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. In theory the resulting research data could be kept a 
trade secret without term limit. In practice, however, government regulators obligate 
pharmaceutical innovators to provide the research data to them in order to determine 
whether the product achieves safety and efficacy standards and thus should be granted 
marketing approval. Governments require that regulators protect the research data from 
unfair commercial use by competitors and other third parties. The term of exclusivity 
under U.S. law is 5 years and up to 10 years in European practice from the registration 
date. After the data protection term expires, competing generic producers need not repeat 
the tests but need only show that their product is equivalent to the original chemical. 
Economists compute the direct costs of the development process to about $300 
million for the typical new drug and, when the costs of capital and of failed R&D efforts 
are included in the analysis, total R&D costs amount to about $800 million (DIMASI; 
HANSEN; GRABOWKSI, 2003). Yet, the resulting compound – once known to be safe 
and effective – is easily reverse engineered and the actual manufacturing production costs 
are modest as a percentage of the innovation costs (DIMASI, 1995b).   
Since only about one percent of chemical compounds identified as having 
therapeutic potential emerge from the development and regulatory process (DIMASI, 
1995a), R&D losers are a non-trivial issue that makes the drug innovation business 
exceedingly risky (GRABOWSKI; VERNON, 1990). However, just like prospectors 
staking real property claims when looking for gold, innovators stake their intellectual 
property claims with no guarantee that gold will be indeed their reward (KITCH, 1977). 
The economics of technological innovation are a lot like gambling or a lottery because 
most innovations are of modest value or even worthless (Scherer, 2000) and that 
economic reality has some big implications for innovators and policy-makers 
(SCHERER; HARHOFF, 2000). The gambling simile characterizes the blockbuster or 
bust nature of the innovative pharmaceutical business especially well. Managerial 
economists explain that innovative pharmaceutical companies keep growing through 
mergers and acquisitions as well as organically to create R&D scope so that they can 
manage organizational learning opportunities, the huge financial capital demands, and the 
risks of product development failure (HENDERSON; COCKBURN, 1994, 1996).   
The European experience with patents for the life sciences has been shaped by its 
political economy: diverse legal and policy responses from country-to-country, but a 
harmonization trend in law and administration owing to the European Patent Convention 
and establishment of the European Patent Office (though national patent offices continue 
to exist), but frequent and persistent social-political opposition to biomedical innovation 
progress and legal reform (STRAUS, 2003). Scherer and Weisburst (1995) addressed the 
question by studying the effect of patent reform in early-1980s Italy on pharmaceutical 
R&D and innovation. They found that the effect had been modest, but cautioned that the 
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Italian government had enforced the most stringent pharmaceutical price controls in 
Europe during their reform era, which may have ―overwhelmed the stimulative incentive 
effects of drug product patent protection‖ (SCHERER; WEISBURST, 1995, p. 1023).    
Japanese patent reforms of 1988 intended to encourage more technology 
innovation, but did not have much impact across technologies in the 1990s, perhaps 
because the corporate sector remained on its path-dependencies and the overall 
environment did not encourage entrepreneurship (SAKAKIBARA; BRANSTETTER, 
2001). But, the pharmaceutical sector in Japan did increase its innovative activity 
(KAWAURA; LACROIX, 1995). Effective patent rights do not by themselves foment 
technology innovation. 
 
3  BIO-MEDICAL “MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY” 
 
Successful technology commercialization entails product/service development, 
production, and distribution. However, the technological innovator need not possess all 
these capabilities--or, complementary assets—within the organization. Some of the 
essential questions of technology management concern which capabilities to possess, 
acquire, or build inside the organization and which capabilities to leave to a partner. 
When these capabilities can be gained through partnership, then efficient technology 
markets play vital facilitating roles (ARORA; FOSFURI; GAMBARDELLA, 2001). 
From a managerial perspective, technology leakage should be minimized; technology 
transactions should be as efficient as possible. Sufficiently strong appropriability regimes 
establish the institutional conditions for markets for technology
 
(ARORA, 1997).   
That is, sufficiently strong appropriability regimes facilitate licensing and cross-
licensing relationships between and among business partnerships. The parties to a 
licensing or cross-licensing of technology relationship look to patent rights so that the 
nature of the knowledge to be transferred and the terms of its use can be specified 
through contract (GRINDLEY; TEECE, 1997). By contrast, without efficient technology 
markets technology innovators have either to possess, acquire, or build the 
complementary assets themselves—or fail in the marketplace with the new technology. 
Universities in the United States have become important participants in 
technology markets. The traditional means used by universities to disseminate their 
knowledge has included the hosting of research seminars on their campuses to discuss 
works-in-progress; presentations at scholarly research conferences attended by 
specialists in particular disciplines and fields; publication in peer-reviewed scholarly 
research journals; and helping their students find jobs in academic, government, and 
industry research settings. American policymakers came to believe in the late 1970s that 
this generally effective research system was nevertheless not as effective as it could be at 
encouraging the commercialization of research findings with potential market 
applications: Too many promising technologies remained shelved rather than 
commercialized. 
The United States Congress with the Bayh-Dole Act and the Cooperative 
Research and Development Act (CRADA) gave universities and government research 
laboratories the authority to apply for patents for research findings that resulted from 
public funding so that rights to the research could be formally licensed to the private 
sector for further development and commercialization. The policy rationale was that 
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property rights would provide incentives to individual university researchers to consider 
market applications in their research, to the administrators at universities to organize for 
technology transfer, and to private industry to invest in further commercial development 
of basic technologies. 
These policy reforms were controversial at the time and have become perhaps 
more controversial as the number of patents earned by universities has increased. The 
primary effect of Bayh-Dole on university research has been the establishment of 
technology transfer offices (TTOs) at many research universities, a substantial increase in 
the number of patents earned by universities and their researchers, and a few examples of 
universities with substantial royalty revenues. To critics of Bayh-Dole, however, the 
primary effect has been mission conflict: Is the mission of the university to create and 
disseminate knowledge and, if so, why establish barriers to access? (SAMPAT, 2006). 
―[I]f the findings of publicly-funded university research are placed in the public domain, 
or are inexpensively licensed to anyone who wants to use them, competition alone may 
stimulate their widespread application‖ says one critic (MOWERY et al., 1999, p. 268). 
The claim that open dissemination of science and technology best facilitates 
technological progress, that patents and TTOs divert university resources away from the 
primary mission of basic research and public dissemination, is sobering and worthy of 
carefully scrutiny and study. 
The Bayh-Dole critics inspired other social scientists to gather evidence and 
assess he merits of the critique. The following are some key research findings: 
 Study of MIT‘s TTO, an operation that long pre-dates the Bayh-Dole Act, 
shows, even at a university famous for the number of patents earned, the number 
of technologies that get to the marketplace, and the number of students and 
faculty who start-up enterprises, patenting still represents a very small 
percentage of research activity at the university (AGRAWAL; HENDERSON, 
2002). 
 Most patents do not contribute much if any royalty revenues; only a few patents 
bring home substantial royalties and only one or two patents prove to be 
blockbusters (FELDMAN et al., 2002). 
 An industry survey with the assistance of the Association of University 
Technology Managers finds that 85% of university research still needs more 
development research to be useful; 45% of university research needs a great deal 
more development research to be useful (THURSBY; THURSBY, 2002). 
 
 The economics of university patenting, hence, look like the economics of 
technology innovation more generally—i.e., most innovations fail in the marketplace. 
These economics of university patenting challenge TTOs to manage skillfully their 
resources, which tend to be modest:  Many technologies do not merit the expense of the 
patent process; those that do depend on TTOs that identify the appropriate licensee(s) and 
that‘s a tricky proposition (MOWERY; SAMPAT; ZIEDONIS, 2002). 
 A managerial economist who studies technology innovation and markets asks 
perhaps the most critical question of all regarding the utility of Bayh-Dole: Do university 
patents lead to more commercialization successes? (SHANE, 2002). His evidence is 
about 1400 patents earned at MIT between 1980 and 1996, supplemented by interviews 
with the MIT TTO staff. He studied the licensees and the licenses that were later 
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terminated because the licensees ―cannot make the technology work in a cost-effective 
manner, because their strategic plans change, because the company does not want to 
continue to pay license fees, or because they have changed the product or business that 
they are developing so that the intellectual property is no longer useful‖ (SHANE, 2002, 
p. 127). 
 Professor Shane finds that inventions are more likely to be licensed when patents 
are an effective mechanism for appropriating the returns to innovation because the patent 
system reduces the transaction costs of technology transfer. Effective university patents 
allow ―commercialization to be undertaken by economic actors who possess a 
comparative advantage in that activity‖ (SHANE, 2002, p. 133). When the patents are 
ineffective, the technology is either developed by the inventor himself, often 
unsuccessfully, or goes undeveloped. He explains: ―Technology commercialization 
involves a set of skills—including identifying customer needs, developing product 
concepts, designing products and processes, prototyping, and manufacturing—that 
university inventors rarely possess‖ (SHANE, 2002, p. 123). These findings comply with 
technology management principles and provide important support for the policy 
rationales provided by proponents of Bayh-Dole. 
Study of contemporary industrial R&D finds that stronger patent rights matter 
more to smaller enterprises than to bigger enterprises, a finding the authors describe as 
―sensible, even obvious‖ but unexplored empirically (ARORA; CECCAGNOLI; 
COHEN, 2007, p. 392). Economic historians find that nineteenth century U.S. technology 
innovation was characterized by the presence of technology markets involving lone 
inventors who licensed their patents to enterprises that would then manufacture it or 
integrate it into their systems (LAMOREAUX; SOKOLOFF, 1999). There is some 
evidence, then, that if it is true that ―the most successful economies are those that have a 
mix of innovative entrepreneurs and larger, more established firms… that refine and mass 
produce the innovations that entrepreneurs […] bring to market‖ (BAUMOL; LITAN; 
SCHRAMM, 2007, p. 4), then patent rights may be especially important for the efficient 
technology markets that enable entrepreneurship, especially as pharmaceutical R&D 
strategy has shifted toward rational design (NIGHTINGALE; MAHDI, 2006).   
 
4  A PATENT ANTI-COMMONS IN THE LIFE SCIENCES? 
 
There is also a school of thought that says that, while the logic of patents as 
incentives, is basically sound, the present global—and especially U.S.—patent system 
has established a bio-medical anti-commons with too many patents in general and 
excessively broad patents with respect to research tools in particular (HELLER; 
EISENBERG, 1998). Patent litigation, actual and the threat of it, influences technology 
management decisions. For example, empirical research shows that biotech firms with 
high litigation costs avoid additional patenting in research areas crowded with patents 
(LERNER, 1995). How judges behave regarding injunctive relief can have big impact on 
technology innovation strategies of firms (AYRES; KLEMPERER, 1999). Jaffe and 
Lerner (2004) contend that the anti-commons phenomenon is an emerging problem in the 
world economy and with Scott Stern are editing an annual series of research papers 
regarding Innovation Policy and the Economy under the auspices of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research.  
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The controversy has led to organized efforts to bring groups of scholars together 
to study these issues, such as the edited volumes led by New York University Law 
School (DREYFUSS; ZIMMERMAN; FIRST, 2001) and the American Enterprise 
Institute-Brookings Institution Joint Center for Regulatory Studies (HAHN, 2005). These 
two volumes shed a great deal of analytical light and summarize a great deal of scholarly 
research and debate, especially with respect to biotechnology (and software) patents and 
competition. Authors tend to divide between scholars concerned about patent thickets and 
litigation costs and associated chilling of technology innovation and scholars who focus 
on licensing, cross-licensing, patent pools, and markets for technology innovation as 
solutions to these problems. This scholarship, however, tends to be analytical rather than 
empirical. A Duke University Engineering School-Kauffman Foundation study sought to 
measure US-based global IP creation by study of the Patent Cooperation statistics of the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WADHAWA et al., 2007). The researchers 
found the US share of world patenting rising, the distribution of patenting activity in the 
United States clustering in particular states, and US university and firm patent filings 
relatively concentrated among innovation leaders. The research, however, was not 
designed to apply the empirical findings to the controversies within institutional 
economics, so it remains unclear whether the numbers add up to a good or bad story for 
technology innovation in America. 
The anti-commons thesis, if demonstrated empirically, would radically alter the 
law and economics of intellectual property. However, Heller and Eisenberg (1998) did 
not offer an empirical study or any real examples of the phenomena they imagine. 
Subsequent empirical study of pharmaceutical R&D competition contends that patent 
blockages are typically overcome in the real-world marketplace through licensing, cross-
licensing, and patent pools in contradiction to the anti-commons thesis (WALSH, 2003). 
Epstein and Kuhlik (2004) dismiss the Heller and Eisenberg thesis as inconsistent with 
both economic theory and marketplace experience. Cohen and Walsh (2007) report their 
recent empirical study findings that bio-medical R&D projects stop 62% of the time 
because of lack of funding, 60% of the time because of lack of time, 29% of the time 
because of competition concerns, and 1% of the time because of patent concerns. Thus, 
there is a good deal of accumulating empirical research contradicting in the real world the 
thesis proposed in academic world that a patent anti-commons plagues life sciences 
R&D. 
In response to the public debates that have proliferated in recent years 
surrounding intellectual property and health, the World Health Organization established a 
special commission composed of leaders from public health, economics, and politics. The 
commission concluded in its 2006 report that intellectual property rights play a decisively 
important role in encouraging bio-medical innovation and cast doubt about the feasibility 
of non-IPR-based models proposed by some advocacy groups. 
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COMO OS DIREITOS DE PROPRIEDADE INTELECTUAL INCENTIVAN A 




Por meio de patentes, governos intervêm nos mercados para prover incentivos aos 
agentes inovadores para investir o seu conhecimento, tempo e dinheiro na criação de 
invenções no contexto do problema da apropriação associada a ativos intangíveis. A 
noção de propriedade intelectual enquanto segredo de transação significa um conjunto de 
informação específica que contém valor comercial e que algum sacrifício foi feito para 
torná-lo e mantê-lo secreto. Produtos farmacêuticos inovadores, de caráter radical ou 
incremental, são especialmente suscetíveis ao problema da apropriação nas atividades 
econômicas baseadas em conhecimento. Tornar uma molécula identificada em 
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laboratório em um fármaco que poderá ser distribuído pelo sistema de saúde pública 
demanda muitos anos de modelagem de computador, testes em animais e, finalmente, 
testes clínicos em humanos. Testes clínicos são desenvolvidos em três fases e cada um 
redunda em uma pletora de dados. Nos Estados Unidos, as leis de vigilância sanitária 
especificam que estes dados sejam mantidos confidenciais e disponíveis para as 
autoridades reguladoras por um período de cinco anos. Na Europa o período é ainda 
maior. Regimes de apropriação suficientemente fortes facilitam a licença e a intra-licença 
entre universidades e empresas de negócios. Suficiente evidência empírica apóia a 
utilização do modelo Bayh-Dole e coloca sérias dúvidas sobre a existência do sistema de 
patentes anti-commons (nota do editor: quando a existência de muitos proprietários 
frustra um resultado socialmente desejável), nas ciências da vida.  
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